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(57)	 ABSTRACT
A real-time multi-tasking digital control system with rapid
recovery capability is disclosed. The control system includes
a plurality of computing units comprising a plurality of
redundant processing units, with each of the processing units
configured to generate one or more redundant control com-
mands. One or more internal monitors are employed for
detecting data errors in the control commands. One or more
recovery triggers are provided for initiating rapid recovery of
a processing unit if data errors are detected. The control
system also includes a plurality of actuator control units each
in operative communication with the computing units. The
actuator control units are configured to initiate a rapid recov-
ery if data errors are detected in one or more of the processing
units. A plurality of smart actuators communicates with the
actuator control units, and a plurality of redundant sensors
communicates with the computing units.
20 Claims, 4 Drawing Sheets
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DISTRIBUTED AND RECOVERABLE
DIGITAL CONTROL SYSTEM
This application claims the benefit of priority to U.S. Pro-
visional Application No. 60/705,843, filed on Aug. 5, 2005,
which is incorporated herein by reference. The present appli-
cation is related to U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/381,
637, filed May 4, 2006, and to U.S. Patent application Ser. No.
11/381,652, filed May 4, 2006, both of which are incorpo-
rated herein by reference.
The U.S. Government may have certain rights in the
present invention as provided for by the terms of Contract No.
CRA NCC-1-393 with NASA.
BACKGROUND TECHNOLOGY
Computers have been used in digital control systems in a
variety of applications, such as in industrial, aerospace, medi-
cal, scientific research, and other fields. In such control sys-
tems, it is important to maintain the integrity of the data
produced by a computer. In conventional control systems, a
computing unit for a plant is typically designed such that the
resulting closed loop system exhibits stability, low-frequency
command tracking, low-frequency disturbance rejection, and
high-frequency noise attenuation. The "plant" can be any
object, process, or other parameter capable of being con-
trolled, such as an aircraft, spacecraft, medical equipment,
electrical power generation, industrial automation, valve,
boiler, actuator, or other device. A control effector is used to
provoke a response by the plant. For example, when the plant
is an aircraft, control effectors may be in the form of flight
control surfaces such as rudders, ailerons, and/or elevators.
Various types of failures or faults may be encountered by
conventional computing units found in control systems. A
"hard fault" is a fault condition typically caused by a perma-
nent failure of the analog or digital circuitry. For digital cir-
cuitry, a "soft fault" is typically caused by transient phenom-
ena that may affect some digital circuit computing elements
resulting in computation disruption, but does not permanently
damage or alter the subsequent operation of the circuitry.
Soft faults maybe caused by electromagnetic fields created
by high-frequency signals propagating through the comput-
ing system. Soft faults may also result from spurious intense
electromagnetic signals, such as those caused by lightning
that induce electrical transients on system lines and data,
buses which propagate to internal digital circuitry setting
latches into erroneous states. In addition to lightning, other
elements of the electromagnetic environment (EME) such as
high-intensity radiated fields (HIRE), radio communications,
radar pulses, and the intense fields associated with electro-
magnetic pulses (EMP) may also cause soft faults. Further,
high-energy atomic particles from a variety of sources (e.g.,
atmospheric neutrons, cosmic radiation, weapon detonation,
etc.) may deposit sufficient energy in the bulk semiconductor
material of a digital device to set electronic circuits into
erroneous states. With the advent of smaller integrated cir-
cuits running at high speeds, soft faults are becoming more
common such as in the radiation environment encountered by
aircraft traveling at high altitudes. In such an environment,
computing circuits containing state-of-the-art digital devices
may be more susceptible to failure.
In conventional control systems, various forms of redun-
dancy have been used in an attempt to reduce the effects of
faults in critical systems. Multiple processing units, for
example, may be used within a computing system. In a system
with three processing units, for example, if one processor is
determined to be experiencing a fault, that processor may be
2
isolated and/or shut down. The fault may be corrected by
correct data (such as the current values of various control state
variables) being transmitted (or "transfused") from the
remaining processors to the isolated unit. If the faults in the
5 isolated unit are corrected, the processing unit may be re-
introduced to the computing system along with the other two
processing units.
Dissimilar computational redundancy is used to prevent
10 the introduction of generic faults in control system architec-
tures. Generic faults refer to common errors in system redun-
dancies. Such errors can occur in the design and development
of the hardware and software elements within general pur-
pose computers that are used in control system architectures.
15 As such, dissimilar computational redundancy would entail
each redundant hardware element using a dissimilar micro-
processor and each redundant microprocessor executing soft-
ware (e.g., operating system, application, etc.) that was devel-
oped using a different programming language.
20 Other methods that have been used to help ensure the
continued operation of control systems include the use of
dissimilar technology, distributed computation redundancy,
equalization, and mid-value voting. Each of these methods,
25 however, generally requires at least one processing unit to
remain operational at all times to preserve state variables.
While the control systems may remain operational if all but
one of the processing units experience a soft fault and the
correctly-operating unit can be identified, the control system
30 will not operate properly if all of the processors simulta-
neously experience soft faults. Similarly, if a lone properly-
operating unit cannot be identified within the system, the
system will not recover, as there would be no identifiable
operating unit with correct values for all of the state variables
35 to be transfused to the remaining units. In addition, because of
the transfusion of state variables from other processing units,
the system recovery may be relatively slow. It may therefore
take an extended period of time for all processing units within
the system to resume normal operation. In the meantime,
40 redundant control is undesirably lost or degraded.
In the aerospace field, digital flight control systems are
frequently interposed between the pilot and the flight control
surfaces of an aircraft. Such systems may include fly-by-wire,
auto-pilot, and auto-land systems. In a fly-by-wire system, in
45 lieu of pilot controls being mechanically coupled (e.g., via
cables or hydraulics) to the various primary flight control
surfaces of the aircraft (such as the ailerons, elevators, and
rudder), the position and movements of a pilot's controls are
electronically read by sensors and transmitted to a computing
50 system. The computing system typically sends electronic
control signals to actuators of various types that are coupled
to the primary flight control surfaces of the aircraft. The
actuators are typically configured to move one or more con-
trol surfaces according to inputs provided by the pilot, or in
55 response to feedback measured by a sensor on the aircraft.
Failure of the control system could thus have catastrophic
effects on the aircraft. Similarly, industrial, medical, or other
systems may be gravely affected by certain control system
failures.
60 In conventional flight control system (FCS) architectures,
recovery from soft faults of FCS architectural elements, par-
ticularly in the flight control computer, is either not possible,
has to resort to recovery attempts after a grace period of time,
or requires recycling of power such as rebooting the com-
65 puter. Any of these circumstances can impact the mean time
between unscheduled removals (MTBUR) negatively. In
addition, tight tolerance monitoring has been dependant on
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synchronous operations for tight tracking of redundant ele-
ments, and has been relatively federated and not easily scale-
able.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
Features of the present invention will become apparent to
those skilled in the art from the following description with
reference to the drawings. Understanding that the drawings
depict only typical embodiments of the invention and are not
therefore to be considered limiting in scope, the invention will
be described with additional specificity and detail through the
use of the accompanying drawings, in which:
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a digital control system
according to one embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a real-time multi-tasking
computing platform that can be used in the digital control
system of the invention;
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a soft fault rapid recovery
system that can be used in the digital control system of the
invention; and
FIG. 4 is a block diagram of a command and recovery
management system that can be used in the digital control
system of the invention.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
The present invention relates to a real-time multi-tasking
computer control system with recovery capability. In one
embodiment, the control system can be implemented with a
flight control computer (FCC) to provide rapid real-time roll-
back recovery in a multi-tasking computer environment.
Selective and isolated recovery triggers are provided for each
FCC used.
In the following description, various embodiments of the
present invention may be described herein in terms of various
architecture elements and processing steps. It should be
appreciated that such elements may be realized by any num-
ber of hardware or structural components configured to per-
form specified operations. For purposes of illustration only,
exemplary embodiments of the present invention will fre-
quently be described herein in connection with aircraft avi-
onics. The invention is not so limited, however, and the con-
cepts and devices disclosed herein may be used in any control
environment. Further, it should be noted that although various
components may be coupled or connected to other compo-
nents within exemplary system architectures, such connec-
tions and couplings can be realized by direct connection
between components, or by connection through other com-
ponents and devices located therebetween. The following
detailed description is, therefore, not to be taken in a limiting
sense.
According to various exemplary embodiments of the
invention, a control system architecture suitably includes suf-
ficient computation redundancy and control command man-
agement to either isolate and recover a faulted processor, or to
recover all processing units of the redundant system without
adverse effects. Computational redundancy may be provided
with multiple processors or processing units within a com-
puter or computing platform. In addition to isolating and
recovering from internal faults, various embodiments allow
processing units to detect faults in other system elements such
as sensors, adaptors, actuators and/or effectors. Further
embodiments may also include one or more actuator adaptor
units, that through the detection of adverse data errors, detect
faults in other system components (that are in addition to the
processing units) and issue discrete instructions to trigger a
recovery.
4
An exemplary control system architecture suitably
includes multiple processors, each of which is configured for
rapid recovery from various faults. The term "rapid recovery"
indicates that recovery may occur in a very short amount of
5 time. To maintain the operation of a control system, it is
generally desirable that a recovery from a soft fault takes
place within about 1 to 2 computing frames. As used herein,
a "computing frame" is the time needed for a particular pro-
cessing unit to perform a repetitive task of a computation,
io e.g., the tasks that need to be calculated continuously to
maintain the operation of the controlled plant. In some
embodiments, processor recovery is performed within about
1 computing frame and redundancy recovery is performed
within about 1 or 2 computing frames, or otherwise in a short
15 enough time period so as to have only minimal effects, if any,
on system performance.
The length of a computing frame is dependent upon the
stability of the plant being controlled. In the aviation industry,
for example, fighter jets are generally less stable than larger
20 passenger jets. Thus, a fighter jet may require computational
updates about every 2 ms to maintain stability, while a more
stable aircraft may only require a computational update about
every 200 ms to maintain the same level of stability. Thus, a
computing frame in a fighter jet may be 2 ms long, while a
25 computing frame for a passenger jet may be 200 ms long.
The ability of a processor to initiate recovery from a soft
fault allows various embodiments of the present invention to
aid in the recovery of the system as a whole. In addition, soft
faults may be detected in the same computing frame or within
30 several frames in which the faults occur. In embodiments
wherein faults are detected within a single computing frame,
eachprocessor need only store control and logic state variable
data for the immediately preceding frame for use in recovery
purposes, which may take place essentially instantaneously.
35 Accordingly, the dependence of each component upon other
redundant components is suitably reduced.
In one embodiment of the invention, a scaleable control
system architecture is provided that can be used for indepen-
dent rapid recovery of any flight control computer (FCC).
4o This provides robust operation in the presence of soft fault
producing threats, and increased system reliability which is
not dependent upon synchronous operations.
Instructions for carrying out the various methods, process
tasks, calculations, control functions, and the generation of
45 signals and other data used in the operation of the system of
the invention are implemented, in some embodiments, in
software programs, firmware, or computer readable instruc-
tions. These instructions are typically stored on any appropri-
ate computer readable medium used for storage of computer
5o readable instructions or data structures. Such computer read-
able media can be any available media that can be accessed by
a general purpose or special purpose computer or processor,
or any programmable logic device.
By way of example, and not limitation, such computer
55 readable media can include floppy disks, hard disks, ROM,
flash memory ROM, nonvolatile ROM, EEPROM, RAM,
CD-ROM, DVD-ROM, or other optical disk storage, mag-
netic disk storage, or other magnetic storage devices, or any
other medium that can be used to carry or store desired pro-
60 gram code means in the form of computer executable instruc-
tions or data structures. When information is transferred or
provided over a network or another communications connec-
tion (either hardwired, wireless, or a combination of hard-
wired orwireless) to a computer, the computer properly views
65 the connection as a computer readable medium. Thus, any
such connection is properly termed a computer readable
medium. Combinations of the above are also included within
US 7,725,215 B2
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the scope of computer readable media. Computer executable
instructions comprise, for example, instructions and data
which cause a general purpose computer, special purpose
computer, or special purpose processing device to perform a
certain function or group of functions.
The system of the invention will also be described in the
general context of computer readable instructions, such as
program modules, being executed by a processor. Generally,
program modules include routines, programs, objects, data
components, data structures, algorithms, etc. that perform
particular tasks or implement particular abstract data types.
Computer executable instructions, associated data structures,
and program modules represent examples of a program code
means for executing steps of the methods disclosed herein.
The particular sequence of such executable instructions or
associated data structures represents examples of correspond-
ing acts for implementing the functions described in such
steps.
Referring now to FIG. 1, an exemplary scaleable architec-
ture of a digital control system 100 according to one embodi-
ment of the invention includes a first computing unit 112 and
a second computing unit 114. The computing units 112 and
114 can be any digital control device such as a digital com-
puter or processor, and provide for redundancy in processing.
Each computing unit 112, 114 suitably includes one or more
processing devices capable of executing multiple and/or
simultaneous software processes. As shown, the computing
units 112 and 114 can include real-time multi-tasking com-
puting platforms such as a primary flight control computer
(PFCC). The PFCC can be an integrated modular computing
platform (IMCP) with dual computing lanes.
The computing units 112 and 114 provide input process-
ing, sensor selection, control laws (e.g., pitch, yaw, and roll
inner loops), monitoring (e.g., actuator and effector position
monitoring), equalization, rapid recovery, redundancy man-
agement, and any appropriate recovery triggers. Although
control system 100 is shown with two computing units, addi-
tional computing units can be employed if desired.
Each of the computing units 112 and 114 are in operative
communication with a multitude of actuator control units
(ACUs) 116, 118, 120, and 122, which provide for actuator
command (Cmd) management and have dual computing
lanes. The ACUs perform command blending and selection,
and use other redundant actuator command values while a
computing platform such as a PFCC lane is recovering. The
ACUs also perform monitoring of actuator command lanes,
data concentration, and initiation of a selective and isolated
recovery trigger of each monitored application. The ACUs
can also be redundant per control axis. Although control
system 100 is shown with four ACUs, a varying number of
ACUs can be employed depending upon system require-
ments. For example, in some embodiments three or more
ACUs can be employed in a control system according to the
invention.
Each ACU 116, 118, 120, and 122 is also in operative
communication with a respective one of a smart actuator 124,
126, 128, and 130. An actuator is made "smart" when an
electronics module such as an electronic interface unit (EIU)
is added to the basic actuator. The smart actuators used in the
control system can be dual-channel, fail-passive, electrome-
chanical actuators, which contain two independent computa-
tional lanes. The smart actuators receive actuator position
command signals from the ACUs. The smart actuators also
determine validity of commands from the computing unit
based on command validity flags and activity monitoring. The
smart actuators 124, 126, 128, and 130 are configured to
6
provide feedback to the respective ACU 116, 118, 120, and
122 related to actuator position information.
The smart actuators 124,126, 128, and 130 can optionally
be in operative communication with a respective servo or
5 actuator device such as hydraulic actuators 132, 134, 136, and
138. The hydraulic actuators 132, 134, 136, and 138 can be
respectively coupled to various control effectors 140, 141,
142, and 143 such as, for example, various primary flight
control surfaces of an aircraft (e.g., rudders, ailerons, and/or
io elevators). The control effectors 140-143 are configured to
provide feedback to the respective ACU 116, 118, 120, and
122 related to effector position information.
As depicted in FIG. 1, the computing units 112 and 114
receive data inputs from sensor sets 150,152, and 154, which
15 can include air data, inertial data, or commands from an
operator (e.g., pilot controls, etc.). The sensor sets can include
any number of gyroscopes, vehicle position sensors, airflow
sensors, temperature sensors, and/or other sensing devices as
may be appropriate for the particular implementation. A data
20 concentrator 156, 158, and 160 with a single lane can be
implemented between each sensor set 150, 152, 154 and
computing units 112 and 114. The data concentrators suitably
receive and concentrate data from the sensors to provide an
interface to computing units 112 and 114 as appropriate. The
25 data concentrators may also provide sensor validity monitor-
ing to ensure that the sensors remain active. Each of the
sensors may optionally include rapid recovery elements if
available and desired for the particular implementation.
The control system 100 can be suitably implemented, for
30 example, as part of a digital flight control system to provide
functions for the safe flight and landing of aerospace vehicles.
The control system 100 provides for independent recovery of
any computing lane, and all system elements can be executed
asynchronously. Also, control system 100 can accommodate
35 the asynchronous operation of dissimilar computational
redundancy. For example, the PFCC performs equalization of
surface positions, and an actuator command management
voting algorithm accommodates asynchronous surface com-
mand inputs and could accommodate computational lanes
40 using dissimilar computational redundancy. Generic faults in
the PFCC can be confined due to other system elements being
sufficiently analyzable.
FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing further details of a
real-time multi-tasking computing platform 200 that can be
45 usedin control system 100 of FIG.1. For example, computing
platform 200 can be implemented in computing units 112 and
114 of control system 100. The computing platform 200 hosts
the software applications that implement multiple integrated
functions with varying degrees of safety impact, and provides
50 scalability to the system. Such scalability allows for ease in
adding extra redundancy, adding extra control effectors, and
adding extra control functions.
The computing platform such as the PFCC provides recov-
ery capability, including rapid real-time rollback recovery in
55 a multi-tasking computer environment. The PFCC enables
integration of functions, and applications may selectively use
the recovery function as required. For example, computing
platform 200 shown in FIG. 2 hosts multiple applications 210,
220, 230, 240, and 250. In this example, applications 210 and
6o 220 implement critical functions provided by the digital con-
trol system, and the recovery mechanism of the platform
provides backup storage of state variable data used by these
applications. If a fault is detected during the execution of
application 210, recovery of only application 210 can be
65 performed without affecting any of the other applications
hosted on the computing platform. The recovery mechanism
operation can be verifiable using common built-in-test meth-
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ods, which can be used to verify operation of the recovery
mechanism at any time. The PFCC can also provide monitor-
ing of effector commands and positions.
During operation of control system 100, computing units
112,114 receive input from sensor sets 150,152,154 via data
concentrators 156, 158, 160. Each computing unit provides
the appropriate data to each computational lane thereof,
which operate as separate partitioned processing units.
Accordingly, each data set from redundant sensor and com-
mand data sets can be simultaneously processed in multiple
isolated processing units. The commands signals from each
lane of computing units 112, 114 propagate to each of the
ACUs 116, 118, 120, and 122. The ACUs transmit the com-
mand signals to the smart actuators 124, 126, 128, and 130,
which then perform the requested commands as appropriate
to control the hydraulic actuators 132, 134, 136, 138, and
thereby the control effectors 140-143. During normal opera-
tion, the output signals from each processing unit can be
monitored internally, or externally by the ACUs, to ensure
that each of the computing units 112, 114 are producing
results within a predetermined tolerance of the remaining
computing units.
Each processing unit of computing units 112, 114 is con-
figured to be capable of rapid recovery from soft faults. To
accomplish rapid recovery, each processing unit is configured
to retrieve control and logic state variable data from internal
memory locations such as a high integrity random access
memory. Using the retrieved state variables and appropriate
sensor data, each processing unit can fully recover from a soft
fault relatively quickly without requiring a data transfusion
from another computing unit. The rapid recovery cycle
involves halting processor execution, instating state variables
from a protected memory area, and starting execution again at
an appropriate location in the program execution cycle.
Through the use of command blending, equalization, or other
techniques, it is not necessary to synchronize with the remain-
ing processing units after initiating the rapid recovery cycle.
For example, FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a soft fault rapid
recovery system 300 that can be used in the digital control
system of the invention. The recovery system 300 is imple-
mented internally in each computing platform such as com-
puting units 112 and 114 of control system 100 in FIG. 1. As
shown in FIG. 3, a monitor 310 is provided that is in operative
communication with a central processing unit (CPU) 320 and
a CPU 322. A memory unit 324 operatively communicates
with CPU 320, and another memory unit 326 operatively
communicates with CPU 322. Protected storage areas can be
provided to store state variable data 350, 352. The protected
storage areas can include high integrity memory cells such as
disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 6,163,480, which is incorporated
herein by reference.
During operation of recovery system 300, state variable
data 350,352 generated by CPU 320 and CPU 322 is stored in
memory units 324 and 326, respectively. The state variable
data is related to the state the CPU operates under for a given
set of inputs and outputs. This data includes states generated
by the computing hardware as well as states generated by the
application software. The data is stored with respect to a given
computing frame N several frames back in time (N-1, N-2, ..
. N-X) in the protected storage areas. If the CPU or a memory
element is upset to generate a soft fault, such as by interfer-
ence from EME energy, monitor 310 rapidly detects the soft
fault and causes a recovery trigger 360 to initiate. This
restores the state variable data saved from one of the previous
computing frames and restarts the upset CPU with the most
recent good data at the next starting computing frame. The
recovery system 300 allows the recovered CPU to start in a
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time frame near to the time frame of the other CPUs in the
system since no reboot of the system is necessary.
A suitable related fault recovery system that can be used in
the control system of the present invention is disclosed in
5 copending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/058,764 filed
on Feb. 16, 2005, which is incorporated herein by reference.
Embodiments of the present invention employ high integ-
rity computer systems utilizing time and space partitioning
which allows hosting of multiple pieces of software on a
10 single piece of hardware. Each piece of software is resident in
hardware and can perform a multitude of computational func-
tions including but not limited to operating systems, moni-
toring systems, and application programs.
Embodiments of the present invention can be used in safety
is critical applications such as a primary flight control applica-
tion that must robustly execute in real time. Safety critical
applications, such as a primary flight control application,
must execute in real time to maintain the stability and control
20 of an aircraft in flight and during landing. Typically, real time
systems are designed to control physical devices (e.g., valves,
servos, motors, heaters) that require timely processing to
perform their designated task correctly. As used in this appli-
cation, real time execution of applications refers to a com-
puter system performing calculations at the current time
25 based on current parameters. In one embodiment, current
parameters include current inputs from sensors. A multi-task-
ing computer system is a computer system adapted to perform
multiple tasks, also known as processes, using shared com-
30 
mon processing resources. A multi-tasking computer system
is adapted to execute two or more software applications
simultaneously by scheduling computer processing resources
between the two or more software applications. In one
embodiment of the present invention, a multi-tasking com-
35 puter system is adapted to schedule computer processing
resources to support execution of at least one application in
real time.
Embodiments of the present invention employ high integ-
rity processing systems utilizing space partitioning. Accord-
40 ingly, when multiple pieces of software are executed by a
single hardware platform, it is problematic if the operation of
one piece of software contaminates the operation of another
piece of software running on the same platform. Thus when
the same hardware platform is used to run both safety critical
45 applications and other applications, care must be taken to
prevent the contamination of a safety critical application by
any other application.
Computer systems implementing time and space partition-
ing are adept at supporting real time computing recovery
50 capabilities. Time and space partitioning of processor
resources guarantees that one application will not corrupt the
memory or execution space of any other application run in
computational frames before or after it. No application can
corrupt the timeline such that the application would overrun
55 its processing time thus starving out the next application
running in the next computational frame.
During a rapid recovery cycle, the tolerance used in an
ACU to determine if a processing unit is operating properly
may be relaxed for that particular processing unit. For
60 example, during normal operation, there may be a predeter-
mined tolerance, within which each of the processing units is
expected to operate. If a processing unit produces values that
are not within the predetermined tolerance, that processing
unit may be determined to be suffering from a soft fault, and
65 a rapid recovery cycle may be initiated. During the rapid
recovery cycle, the predetermined tolerance for the affected
processing unit may be initially widened and then narrowed
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over a predetermined time period such that further deviations 	 ceeds to a recovery cycle, the remaining operating processing
are acceptable until the processing unit resumes normal	 units are unaffectedby the recovery cycle andthe operation of
operation.	 the control system as a whole is unaffected. Because the error
Furthermore, the output of the processing unit may not be 	 is very quickly confined, recovery of redundant control com-
included in the derivation of the output from the ACU (e.g., 5 mands can be processed very rapidly.
computation of the mid-value) until the output comes within 	 FIG. 4 is a block diagram of a command and recovery
the relaxed tolerance. If the output comes within tolerance	 management system 400 that can be used in the digital control
(indicating that the computing unit has stabilized) within a 	 system of the invention. As shown, management system 400
predetermined period of time, it may once again be included
	
is scalable to any number of redundant computing units with
in the output derivation. Before the predetermined time has io internal monitors that operatively communicate with a
expired and the processing unit output has come within tol-	 respective ACU providing an external monitor for the com-
erance, requests for placing the processing unit into a rapid 	 puting units. This allows for ease in adding extra redundancy
recovery state may be suspended or "masked" to allow the 	 to the control system, adding extra control effectors, and
processing unit to recover. Once the processing unit has sta-	 adding extra control functions. The management system 400
bilized from the recovery cycle, it may be subjected to the 15 provides a means for redundancy management that is distrib-
previous tolerances. If the output does not come within tol- 	 uted throughout the system for each redundant component.
erance within the predetermined time, another request to	 As depicted in FIG. 4, a computing unit 410 such as a
place the processing unit into a rapid recovery state may be 	 PFCC includes a processor or computer la with recovery
issued.	 available, and an internal monitor lb that provides a recovery
In general, if the output of a recovered element falls outside 20 trigger lc for computer la. The computing unit 410 is in
of the relaxed tolerance following recovery, that computa- 	 operative communication with ACU 420 having an actuator
tional element is kept off-line until the system is restarted 	 control manager ld that provides mid-value voting and moni-
(i.e., re-powered). Such a failure indicates that the recovery 	 toring of command lanes. An external recovery trigger le is
was unsuccessful. While rare, this provides a means for 	 provided such that ACU 420 can initiate the recovery of
excluding a computational element that does not return to the 25 computing unit 410. A redundant computing unit 450
tolerance within a specified time period. The tolerance used
	
includes a processor or computer (Na) and an internal moni-
following recovery is tightened over a specific time period 	 tor (Nb) that provides a recovery trigger (Nc) for computer
until it reaches the original tolerance. 	 (Na). The computing unit 450 is in operative communication
One technique for computing the blended control output 	 with ACU 460 having an actuator control manager (Nd) that
involves computing a "mid-value" in which the signals from 30 provides mid-value voting and monitoring of command
a processing unit are used to compute a mean and/or median 	 lanes. An external recovery trigger Ne is also provided.
of all of the values produced. This mid-valve is then compared	 The computing unit 410 is also in operative communica-
to each signal from each of the processing units in the system. 	 tion with ACU 460, which provides a redundant external
If a discrepancy exists between any particular value produced 	 recovery trigger (Ne) to computing unit 410. Likewise, com-
by any lane and the mean and/or median of all the values (i.e., 35 puting unit 450 is in operative communication withACU 420,
the mid-values), an error condition is detected and the appro- 	 which provides a redundant external recovery trigger le to
priate processing unit is commanded to initiate a rapid recov-	 computing unit 450. Redundancy is provided by the external
ery cycle. The discrepancy from the mid-values may be based	 recovery triggers since each of the ACUs can initiate com-
upon any tolerance value, which can in turn be adjusted based	 puter recovery, because the ACUs calculate a voted value
upon desired conditions. The detection of discrepancy from a 40 independently.
mean or median value can be processed very rapidly, thus 	 During operation of management system 400, a command
potentially resulting in an identification of an error within one 	 signal if is sent from computer la to ACU 420 and ACU 460.
or two computational frames of the value being produced. 	 If either ACU detects an errant command (for instance an
Accordingly, differences from mid-values may be computed 	 errant command caused by a soft fault), external recovery
based upon previous mid-values (i.e., values maintained from 45 triggers le or (Ne) can be initiated for computer la recovery.
a previous frame), or can be computed in real time as appro- 	 Likewise, a command signal (Nf) from computer (Na) is sent
priate.	 to ACU 460 and ACU 420, which can initiate external recov-
Alternatively, when one or more of the ACUs 116, 118,	 ery triggers (Ne) and le, respectively, for soft fault recovery
120, 122 sense that one of the computing units 112, 114 are	 of computer (Na). The internal monitors lb and (Nb) can also
not supplying signals that lie within certain tolerances, the 50 initiate recovery of computers la and (Na) through internal
ACUs may transmit a signal to the computing unit in question 	 recovery triggers lc and (Nc), respectively. If an ACU or the
to request the start of a rapid recovery cycle for a particular	 internal monitors sense a hard fault (i.e., an unrecoverable
processing unit.	 fault), then the appropriate computing unit may be shut down
The computing units may also be configured to provide 	 or isolated as appropriate.
equalization, in which the control signal generated by each 55	 When the digital control system of the invention is used in
processing unit are driven toward fine adjustments in the	 the context of aerospace flight control, the control system
computed mid-value, so that the signals produced by each 	 performs the safety functions necessary for safe flight and
processing unit result in an equalized control command. Such
	
landing of aircraft. The control system architecture maintains
implementations typically do not require tight synchroniza-	 a pilot connection to control surfaces at all times with no
tion between the various processing units to achieve "equal- 6o analog backup mode required. The control system architec-
ized" command values because each command signal is 	 ture also supports multiple recoveries of a flight control com-
driven toward the other signals (i.e., toward a mid-value). 	 puter (FCC) from multiple monitors in real time. This is
By implementing command blending and equalization, 	 provided by using multiple redundant actuator command
rapid recovery is provided for in a transparent, seamless way. 	 management per axis, and by the FCC supporting multiple
That is, any data errors in any processing unit do not propa- 65 redundant external recovery triggers. The FCC and other
gate through the system to adversely affect the control func- 	 elements of the control system can execute asynchronously,
tion. If one processing unit encounters a soft fault and pro- 	 and the FCC performs equalization on surface positions.
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The recovery management of the control system does not
compromise aircraft stability, since recovery of each comput-
ing lane occurs before an aircraft effect is produced. Even if
all computing lanes needed to be recovered, such a recovery
would occur before an aircraft effect would be produced. The
additional layers of actuator command processing within the
control system assures that no aircraft effect is produced
during and after recovery. By employing recovery manage-
ment of redundant elements during/after FCC recovery from
soft faults, the actuator command management can use other
redundant actuator command values while the FCC is recov-
ering.
In order not to mask hard faults when soft fault recovery is
part of a computing environment implementing a flight con-
trol function, some form of monitoring for number of recov-
eries should be provided. Along with keeping track of the
number of recoveries, monitoring criteria should, at a mini-
mum, limit the time in which some maximum number of
recoveries are allowed for systems that are flight critical,
particularly flight control systems. The multiple redundant
elements in the control system of the invention provide hard
fault management/containment. Using distributed redun-
dancy management ensures that a recurring FCC fault is
eventually treated as a hard fault since a hard fault or failure is
not inadvertently masked by recovery. For example, a recov-
ery retry counter can be used to ensure that a recurring FCC
fault is eventually treated as a hard failure. The FCC will be
taken off-line if excessive recovery retries occur in too short
of a time.
Determinism of faults is supported by the control system
architectural elements. For example, generic faults are con-
fined to the FCC because the other elements in the system are
sufficiently analyzable. The recovery mechanism operation is
verifiable using common built-in test methods while in ser-
vice, guaranteeing the recovery mechanism is functional
before dispatch. The control system supports graceful as well
as rapid recovery of multi-processing computing elements.
The increased reliability of the control system because of
rapid recovery increases the mean time between unscheduled
removals (MTBUR) for the FCC, moving it toward the mean
time between failure (MTBF). Rapid recovery restores cor-
rect operation so that no cockpit effect is observed and there-
fore removal of system hardware due to soft faults will be
significantly reduced.
The present invention may be embodied in other specific
forms without departing from its essential characteristics.
The described embodiments and methods are to be consid-
ered in all respects only as illustrative and not restrictive. The
scope of the invention is therefore indicated by the appended
claims rather than by the foregoing description. All changes
that come within the meaning and range of equivalency of the
claims are to be embraced within their scope.
What is claimed is:
1. A digital control system, comprising:
an integrated modular computing platform comprising:
a plurality of computing units comprising:
a plurality of redundant processing units, each of the
processing units configured to generate one or
more redundant control commands and execute a
plurality of different applications that are time and
space partitioned;
one or more internal monitors for detecting one or
more data errors in the control commands and in
application state data; and
one or more recovery triggers for initiating rapid
recovery of a processing unit or a specific applica-
tion if one or more data errors are detected;
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• plurality of actuator control units each in operative com-
munication with the redundant processing units, each of
the actuator control units having a pair of redundant
computational lanes configured to analyze the control
5 commands and provide feedbackto the processing units,
the actuator control units configured to initiate a rapid
recovery if one or more data errors is detected in one or
more of the processing units;
• plurality of smart actuators each in operative communi-
10	 cation with a separate one of the actuator control units,
the smart actuators configured to receive an actuator
control command from the actuator control units and
provide feedback to the actuator control units; and
• plurality of redundant sensor sets in operative communi-
15	 cation with the computing units.
2. The system of claim 1, wherein software applications in
the processing units can selectively implement the rapid
recovery.
3. The system of claim 1, wherein the processing units
20 provide monitoring of actuator commands and actuator posi-
tions.
4. The system of claim 1, wherein the rapid recovery is
verifiable using a built-in test during real-time.
5. The system of claim 1, further comprising means for
25 redundancy management distributed throughout the system
for each redundant component.
6. The system of claim 1, wherein all system elements can
be executed asynchronously.
7. The system of claim 1, wherein the actuator control units
3o are configured to compute a blended command for the control
commands, and initiate a rapid recovery in one or more of the
processing units if the difference between a control command
generated by a processing unit and the blended command
exceeds a threshold value.
35	 8. The system of claim 1, wherein each actuator control
unit independently monitors each processing unit command.
9. The system of claim 1, further comprising a plurality of
actuator devices, each of the actuator devices in operative
40 
communication with a separate one of the smart actuators.
10. The system of claim 9, wherein the actuator devices are
each operatively connected to one or more control effectors.
11. The system of claim 1, wherein the internal monitors
are configured to detect one or more soft faults in the process-
45 ing units.
12. The system of claim 11, further comprising a soft fault
recovery system in the computing units, the soft fault recov-
ery system configured to duplicate state variable data stored
in one or more memory devices in the computing units.
50 13. The system of claim 12, wherein the soft fault recovery
system is configured to restore the duplicate state variable
data when a soft fault is detected so that one or more process-
ing units can resume processing using the duplicate state
variable data.
55 14. The system of claim 1, wherein management of system
redundancy occurs before, during, and after recovery.
15. The system of claim 1, wherein the processing units
provide a real-time multi-tasking computing environment.
16.Arecoverable digital flight control system, comprising:
60	 an integrated modular computing platform comprising:
a first primary flight control computer having a pair of
redundant computational lanes configured to generate
one or more redundant flight control commands, the
first primary flight control computer comprising:
65	 a plurality of processing units, each of the processing
units configured to execute a plurality of different
applications that are time and space partitioned
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one or more internal monitors for detecting one or
more data errors in the flight control commands and
in application state data; and
one or more recovery triggers for initiating rapid
recovery if one or more data errors are detected;
a second primary flight control computer configured for
redundant processing with respect to the first primary
flight control computer and having a pair of redundant
computational lanes configured to generate one or
more redundant flight control commands, the second
primary flight control computer comprising:
a plurality of processing units, each of the processing
units configured to execute a plurality of different
applications that are time and space partitioned;
one or more internal monitors for detecting one or
more data errors in the flight control commands and
in application state data; and
one or more recovery triggers for initiating rapid
recovery if one or more data errors are detected;
a plurality of actuator control units each in operative com-
munication with the primary flight control computers,
each of the actuator control units having a pair of redun-
dant computational lanes configured to analyze the flight
14
control commands and provide feedback to each of the
computational lanes of the primary flight control com-
puters;
a plurality of dual channel smart actuators each in operative
s communication with a separate one of the actuator con-
trol units, the smart actuators configured to receive an
actuator control command from the actuator control
units and provide feedback to the actuator control units;
and
10	 a plurality of redundant flight sensors in operative commu-
nication with the primary flight control computers.
17. The system of claim 16, wherein the smart actuators are
in operative communication with a plurality of flight control
surfaces.
is 18. The system of claim 16, wherein fault events and recov-
eries are transparent to aircraft function, and recovery man-
agement of the system does not compromise aircraft stability.
19. The system of claim 16, wherein any recurring fault is
treated as a hard failure.
20 20. The system of claim 16, wherein generic faults in the
primary flight control computers are confined due to other
system elements being sufficiently analyzable.
